More widespread farming of species not typically used as livestock may be part of a sustainable approach for promoting human health and economic prosperity in a world with an increasing population; a current example is peccary farming in the Neotropics. Others have argued that species that are local to a region and which are usually not farmed should be considered for use as livestock. They may have a more desirable nutrient profile than species that are presently used as livestock. It (...) may also reduce the pressure from hunting on other wild species, and cause less environmental damage than exotic species. We propose a sentiocentric utilitarian framework that could be used to decide whether species that are local, but generally not used as livestock, should be farmed. To illustrate the use of our decision-making framework, we employ two contrasting neotropical case studies: the Spotted Paca (Cuniculus paca) and the Capybara (Hydrochoerus hydrochaeris). We argue that it may be acceptable to use non-sentient species that are typically not farmed as livestock. However, research should determine whether farming them offers human, environmental or sustainability benefits. In addition, we recommend that if invertebrate species are considered for farming, research should be conducted to determine the likelihood that they are sentient. Finally, given the ethical failings of current livestock farming practices, we argue that a high bar must be met if ‘new’ species that are sentient are to be farmed. (shrink)

More widespread farming of species not typically used as livestock may be part of a sustainable approach for promoting human health and economic prosperity in a world with an increasing population; a current example is peccary farming in the Neotropics. Others have argued that species that are local to a region and which are usually not farmed should be considered for use as livestock. They may have a more desirable nutrient profile than species that are presently used as livestock. It (...) may also reduce the pressure from hunting on other wild species, and cause less environmental damage than exotic species. We propose a sentiocentric utilitarian framework that could be used to decide whether species that are local, but generally not used as livestock, should be farmed. To illustrate the use of our decision-making framework, we employ two contrasting neotropical case studies: the Spotted Paca (Cuniculus paca) and the Capybara (Hydrochoerus hydrochaeris). We argue that it may be acceptable to use non-sentient species that are typically not farmed as livestock. However, research should determine whether farming them offers human, environmental or sustainability benefits. In addition, we recommend that if invertebrate species are considered for farming, research should be conducted to determine the likelihood that they are sentient. Finally, given the ethical failings of current livestock farming practices, we argue that a high bar must be met if ‘new’ species that are sentient are to be farmed. (shrink)

On 6 September 1836, George White wrote from Hatton Garden to T. B. Hall in Liverpool:I see by an advertisement that [there is] a proposition to form a Society to be called the Botanical Society of London—Its objects are the advancement of Botanical Science in general but more especially systematic and descriptive Botany—the formation of a Library, Museum & Herbarium—A meeting will be held at the Crown & Anchor, Strand, tomorrow evening & it is my intention to attend it—It (...) has been proposed thatLadiesshould be admitted!!!If the writer of those words lived up to his declared intention and did attend that or any other of the long string of inaugural meetings the Society held during the last quarter of that year, he would have been startled, perhaps even appalled to find how seriously that last-mentioned proposal had been taken. For on 3 November he would have found in the room at the Crown and Anchor Tavern (according to one report) ‘a crowded assembly of both ladies and gentlemen’. He would also have heard the founder of the Society, the nineteen-year-old Daniel Cooper, deliver a paper on the effects of light on plants, which (according to the same report) ‘excited great interest, more particularly with the ladies’. A fortnight later the meeting was again ‘numerously attended’ and again it attracted a number of the supposedly unlearned sex, some of whom by then were ‘members of the society’ unambiguously. (shrink)

Critically significant parental effects in behavioral genetics may be partly understood as a consequence of maternal brain structure and function of caregiving systems recently studied in humans as well as rodents. Key parental brain areas regulate emotions, motivation/reward, and decision making, as well as more complex social-cognitive circuits. Additional key environmental factors must include socioeconomic status and paternal brain physiology. These have implications for developmental and evolutionary biology as well as public policy.

Live donor kidney transplantation is the best treatment option for most patients with late-stage chronic kidney disease; however, the rate of living kidney donation has declined in the United States. A consensus conference was held June 5-6, 2014 to identify best practices and knowledge gaps pertaining to live donor kidney transplantation and living kidney donation. Transplant professionals, patients, and other key stakeholders discussed processes for educating transplant candidates and potential living donors about living kidney donation; efficiencies in the living (...) donor evaluation process; disparities in living donation; and financial and systemic barriers to living donation. We summarize the consensus recommendations for best practices in these educational and clinical domains, future research priorities, and possible public policy initiatives to remove barriers to living kidney donation. (shrink)

To find more information about Rowman and Littlefield titles, please visit www.rowmanlittlefield.com.

This book updates and adds to the classic Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies, showing how social movement theory has grown and changed.

Information is a force multiplier. Knowledge of the enemy's capability and intentions may be of far more value to a military force than additional troops or firepower. Situation assessment is the ongoing process of inferring relevant information about the forces of concern in a military situation. Relevant information can include force types, firepower, location, and past, present and future course of action. Situation assessment involves the incorporation of uncertain evidence from diverse sources. These include photographs, radar scans, and other forms (...) of image intelligence, or IMINT; electronics intelligence, or ELINT, derived from characteristics (e.g., wavelength) of emissions generated by enemy equipment; communications intelligence, or COMINT, derived from the characteristics of messages sent by the enemy; and reports from human informants (HUMINT). These sources must be combined to form a model of the situation. The sheer volume of data, the ubiquity of uncertainty, the number and complexity of hypotheses to consider, the high-stakes environment, the compressed time frame, and deception and damage from hostile forces, combine to present a staggeringly complex problem. Even if one could formulate a decision problem in reasonable time, explicit determination of an optimal decision policy exceeds any reasonable computational resources. While it is tempting to drop any attempt at rational analysis and rely purely on simple heuristics, we argue that this can lead to catastrophic outcomes. We present an architecture for a ``complex decision machine'' that performs rational deliberation to make decisions in real time. We argue that resource limits require such an architecture to be grounded in simple heuristic reactive processes. We thus argue that both simple heuristics and complex decision machines are required for effective decision making in real time for complex problems. We describe an implementation of our architecture applied to the problem of military situation assessment. (shrink)

Information is a force multiplier. Knowledge of the enemy's capability and intentions may be of far more value to a military force than additional troops or firepower. Situation assessment is the ongoing process of inferring relevant information about the forces of concern in a military situation. Relevant information can include force types, firepower, location, and past, present and future course of action. Situation assessment involves the incorporation of uncertain evidence from diverse sources. These include photographs, radar scans, and other forms (...) of image intelligence, or IMINT; electronics intelligence, or ELINT, derived from characteristics (e.g., wavelength) of emissions generated by enemy equipment; communications intelligence, or COMINT, derived from the characteristics of messages sent by the enemy; and reports from human informants (HUMINT). These sources must be combined to form a model of the situation. The sheer volume of data, the ubiquity of uncertainty, the number and complexity of hypotheses to consider, the high-stakes environment, the compressed time frame, and deception and damage from hostile forces, combine to present a staggeringly complex problem. Even if one could formulate a decision problem in reasonable time, explicit determination of an optimal decision policy exceeds any reasonable computational resources. While it is tempting to drop any attempt at rational analysis and rely purely on simple heuristics, we argue that this can lead to catastrophic outcomes. We present an architecture for a ``complex decision machine'' that performs rational deliberation to make decisions in real time. We argue that resource limits require such an architecture to be grounded in simple heuristic reactive processes. We thus argue that both simple heuristics and complex decision machines are required for effective decision making in real time for complex problems. We describe an implementation of our architecture applied to the problem of military situation assessment. (shrink)

Philosophers constantly discuss Responsibility. Yet in every discussion of which I am aware, a rather obvious point is ignored. The obvious point is that responsibility is ascribed to collectives, as well as to individual persons. Blaming attitudes are held towards collectives as well as towards individuals. Responsibility is often ascribed to nations, towns, clubs, groups, teams, and married couples. ‘Germany was responsible for the Second World War’; ‘The club as a whole is to blame for being relegated’. Such statements (...) are not rare. (shrink)

Recent ideological positioning on the world stage has born a startling resemblance to a form of positioning within nursing theory – that of taking complex ideas, reducing them to a simplistic binary form, and uncritically adopting one half of that form. In some cases, this adoption of a binary position has led to a passionately held form of ‘othering’ that prohibits a healthy and critical engagement with ideas. As alluring as settling for the binary form may be – we (...) argue for holding binaries in tension as a catalyst for stimulating dialogue – reasoning and exploration of new ways of wrestling with the social and moral complexity of nursing. (shrink)

Conference summary. This summary discusses the main issues of the proceedings of the IV International Scientific Conference “Creativity as the National Environment: Media and Social Activity,” which was held from July 2 to July 4, 2018 in Saint Petersburg. The conference was organized by the Department of Philosophy of the Humanities Faculty of the Saint Petersburg State Economic University, the Russian Philosophical Society, the Society of Russian Philosophy at the Ukrainian Philosophical Foundation, and the Department of Philosophy of the (...) Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Being united by interest in the research on social activity in the media space and the national environment of creativity, 63 scholars from Russia, Ukraine, Slovakia and Hungary took part in the conference. The summary considers the ideas discussed at two plenary sessions and at the following sections of the conference: “Metaphysical foundations of the creative process,” “Semantic element of artistic and aesthetic creativity,” “Creativity of a social subject in the field of media space.” The proceedings of the conference contain the results of research carried out in the field of the philosophy of creativity and related research areas, including social philosophy, sociology, cultural studies, political science, journalism, linguistics. (shrink)

" Nous avons tenté dans cet ouvrage de tracer le chemin qui va de la logique traditionnelle à la logique transcendantale [...] à la logique transcendantale qui n'est pas une seconde logique mais qui est seulement la logique elle-même, radicale et concrète, qui doit son développement à la méthode phénoménologique. En vérité, pour s'exprimer plus précisément, nous n'avons justement eu en vue, comme logique transcendantale, que la logique telle qu'elle est délimitée traditionnellement, la logique analytique qui sans contredit grâce à (...) sa généralité vide et formelle embrasse toutes les sphères d'êtres et d'objets, corrélativement toutes les sphères de connaissances. Toutefois, étant astreints à reconsidérer la caractérisation du sens et de l'ampleur de la recherche transcendantale, nous avons par avance acquis aussi du même coup le moyen de comprendre les " logiques " (qu'il reste à fonder) ayant un autre sens, conçues comme doctrines de la science, mais comme doctrines matérielles ; doctrines de la science parmi lesquelles la plus élevée et la plus étendue serait la logique de la science absolue, la logique de la philosophie phénoménologico-transcendantale elle-même ". E. Husserl. (shrink)

Based on two workshops held February 1990 in New York and March 1990 in San Francisco. Following the presentation and discussion of three clinical case histories, psychotherapists James F. Masterson, Marian Tolpin, and Peter E. Sifneos compare and contrast developmental, self, and object relations.

The ``Many Sides of Logic'' is a volume containing a selection of the papers delivered at three simultaneous events held between 11-17 May 2008 in Paraty, RJ, Brazil, continuing a tradition of three decades of Brazilian and Latin-American meetings and celebrating the 30th anniversary of an institution congenital with the mature interest for logic, epistemology and history of sciences in Brazil: CLE 30 - 30th Anniversary of the Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science at the State (...) University of Campinas (UNICAMP) XV EBL -15th Brazilian Logic Conference XIV SLALM - 14th Latin-American Symposium on Mathematical Logic Several renowned logicians, philosophers and mathematicians gathered in colonial Paraty, a historic village on the Brazilian coast founded in the 17th Century and surrounded by the luscious Atlantic rain forest to deliver lectures and talks celebrating the many sides of logic: the philosophical, the mathematical, the computational, the historical, and the multiple facets therein. The topics of the joint conferences, well represented here, included philosophical and mathematical Logic and applications with emphasis on model theory and proof theory, set theory, non-classical logics and applications, history and philosophy of logic, philosophy of the formal sciences and issues on the foundations of mathematics. The events have been preceded by a Logic School planned for students and young researchers held at the UNICAMP campus in Campinas, SP. (shrink)

Proceedings of the II World Congress on Paraconsistency held in Juquey, SP, Brazil, from May 12-19, 2000.

A good number of therapists have tumed to the antirealism of postmodern theory in general, and postmodern literary theory in particular, to justify their antitheoretical preferences. Does this turn make sense? Given what drives the antitheoretical agenda - the aspiration to individualize therapeutic practice so as to optimize each client’s unique potential for change - the answer is no. More specifically, I argue that it is the composition (i.e., the completeness) of the theoretical system that guides therapeutic practice, rather than (...) the therapist’s epistemological leanings, that does have considerable bearing on the recalcitrant problem of individualizing practice, otherwise known as the nomothetic/idiographic problem.Bon nombre de thérapeutes se sont toumés vers I’antiréalisme de la théorie postmoderne, en particulier de la théorie littéraire postmoderne, pour justifier leurs positions antithéoriques. Qu’en est-il de ce choix? Si l’on considère le moteur de l’idéologie antithéorique - à savoir l’aspiration à individualiser la pratique thérapeutique afin d’optimiser le potentiel de changement propre à chaque patient - il faut admettre qu’elle ne tient pas. De façon plus spécifique, je soutiens que c’est la composition (c’est-à-dire la complétude) du système théorique qui guide la pratique thérapeutique, non pas les inclinations épistémologiques du thérapeute, lesquelles ont par ailleurs une incidence considérable sur le problème tenace de I’individualisation de la pratique, connu aussi en tant que problème nomothétique/idiographique. (shrink)

It is widely held that if an agent is not morally responsible for her action – i.e., if she is not deserving of blame – then we have a (decisive) reason to refrain from blaming her. But though this is true, the fact that someone is deserving of blame isn’t clearly sufficient for there to be most allthings- considered reason for blaming that person. Other considerations bear on this question as well. Coates offers an account of some of these (...) considerations – particularly those that can serve as deontic constraints on blame. He also offers a reply to those skeptical of the “ethics of blame” on the grounds that such theorizing invariably appeals to the “wrong kind of reasons.”. (shrink)

The manuscripts of Cicero's De oratore divide into two families: mutili and integri. The oldest representatives of the mutilated family are Avranches 238 , Erlangen 380 , and London, Harley 2736 . A and H are independent of each other, and the best witnesses to the text of the lost archetype . E too is considered to be an independent witness. Since the work of E. Ströbel, dating from the early eighties of the last century, the view has been generally (...) held that E, though closely related to A, is not a descendant of it but a copy of a ‘gemellus’ of A. The stemma devised by Ströbel has remained essentially the same to the present day. (shrink)

Memoirs and papers presented at a conference held on the occasion of the 90th birthday of the Mongolian philosopher Ts. Balkhaajav.

In the Mon. Ancyr. II. 2–11 Augustus makes four statements: He carried out a lectio senatus on three occasions. He held a census in his sixth consulship with Agrippa as his colleague, and completed the lustrum after an interval of forty-two years, the number of citizens registered being four millions and sixty-three thousand. He completed a second lustrum in 8 B.C. invested with the consular imperium and without a colleague, the number of citizens having increased by one hundred and (...) seventy thousand. He completed a third lustrum in 14 A.D. again invested with the consular imperium, but with Tiberius as his colleague, the number of citizens having again increased by seven hundred and four thousand. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Hobbism and His Anti-Hobbism Daniel E. Flage Thomas Hobbes posed a crise morale to which British philosophers attempted to reply for over a century.1 Hobbes maintained that the terms 'good' and 'evil' have no import beyond individual self-interest and the fulfilment or failure to fulfil one's desires.2 While alluding to lawsofnature knownbyreason,3whetherone deems suchlaws dictates ofprudence4 or laws of some moral import,5 Hobbes held: (1) that the (...) notion ofjustice arises only after the institution of a commonwealth, and (2) that the dictates of justice are merely the dictates of the sovereign.6 Hence, justice is strictly a matter ofconvention. In this paper I argue that the Hume ofthe Treatise was a mitigated Hobbist.7 Like Hobbes, Hume held that the notions of justice and obligation reston a setofconventional social rules. Hume distinguished himselffrom Hobbes primarily with respecttoquestions ofmoral value, and though he provided an account of moral obligation, this was secondary to his considerations of moral value. To establish this, I briefly examine the 'is'-'ought' paragraph before turning to Hume's discussions of obligation and value. 1. 'Is' and Ought' To understand the 'is'-'ought' paragraph, one must consider it in the context of Treatise 3.1.1. There Hume examines the source of one's knowledge ofmoral value, namely, "Whether 'tis by means ofour ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?"s Hume's discussion, however, moves rather freely between considerations ofmoral value ('good' and 'evil', 'virtue' and Vice') and considerations of moral obligation Cright' and'wrong"). Evenin the 'is'-'ought'paragraph, a paragraph that seems to be concerned with purported relations between questions offact and questions ofmoral obligation, Hume explicitly alludes to value claims at the end of the paragraph (T 470). Since a moral philosopher might make any one of three claims regarding the relations between value and obligation, namely, (a) value claims are primary and obligation claims are dependent on them;9 (b) obligation claims are primary and value claims are dependent upon them;10 or (c) there are independent grounds for claims of value and obligation, I argue that Hume was attempting to dispel position (b). If this is correct, then Hume's Volume XVIII Number 2 369 DANIEL E. FLAGE arguments both pave the way for a conventionalist theory ofobligation and undercut Hobbes's rationalistic account ofnatural law.11 Hume's discussion in Treatise 1.1.1 is a critique of moral rationalism. It consists of two types of arguments. First, there is an argument from motivation that since moral qualities influence the passions, but whatis known by reason does notinfluence the passions, moral qualities are not known by reason (T 458-63). Second, there is a series of arguments to show that moral qualities cannot be known by reason. In examining some ofthe latter discussions, we shall see how in rejecting a rationalistic ground for moral obligation, Hume also undercuts any rationalistic ground for claims ofmoral value.12 Remember, Hume's question was "Whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?" (T 456). The rationalists answered this question in terms ofideas, claiming, that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; thattheimmutable measures ofrightand wrongimpose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion, that moraUty, like truth, is discern'd merely by ideas, and by their juxta-position and comparison. (T 456-57) In this, his initial account ofthe rationalists' position, Hume seems to focus on moral obligation, rather than moral value: the alleged eternal fitnesses seem to be moral rules such as, "All cases ofwilful murder are wrong," rather than rules such as, "All cases of wilful murder are vicious (evil)." If it were possible to establish that a rule of moral obUgation is true, a moralist might accept an additional putatively self-evident bridge-principle that, "Any action that is right (wrong) is virtuous (vicious)," and thereby deduce a claim of moral value... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 381 Nature and Motion in the Middle.Ages. By FR. JAMES A. WEISHE,IPL. Edited by William E. Carroll. Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, v. 11. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of American Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 292. In this book the editor brings together some articles previously published by Fr. James Weisheipl which deal with various questions relating to Aristotle's natural philosophy along with (...) some medieval interpretations, mainly by St. Thomas Aquinas. The volume was not originally intended to be a posthumous offering, but Fr. James's untimely death has made it into one, and the editor provides a warm ' In Memoriam' at the end. During his fruitful scholarly career in medieval studies Weisheipl devoted much of his efforts to correcting what he took to be some basic modern misunderstandings of Aristotelian and medieval natural philosophy. A long-standing and still commonly held view has it that modern science became possible only after a total and unequivocal rejection of Aristotle's understanding of physical science. According to this theory, science as we now understand it appeared only in the seventeenth century. which is to say long after the close of the Middle Ages (pp. 261 ff.) and therefore, apart from purely historical interest, there remains nothing to be gained from a study of the medieval view of science. In the last century, however, Pierre Duhem argued that heretofore unrecognized linkages exist between modern science and the much earlier efforts by Aristotle and his medieval interpreters. Following Duhem's pioneering work, more recent scholarship has increased still further our knowledge of the relationship between early and modern science, with some (e.g. A. Maier) emphasizing elements of discontinuity and others (e.g. Weisheipl ) pointing out some long neglected but nonetheless philosophically sound and therefore still valuable insights of Aristotle and his medieval disciples. Weisheipl argues that the Aristotelian/medieval notion of nature is perfectly compatible with what he terms the physico-mathematical approach so profitably adopted by modern science. (ch. 11) He rejects the idea that the scientist, after the weleome advances of men like Galileo and Newton, is henceforward correct in replacing the earlier concept of nature with a purely mechanistic model of the universe. The more recent fruitful application of the physico-mathematieal method in science, far from requiring the rejection of Aristotle's concept of nature in favor of a nature-less mechanical model, finds a needed complimentarity with its inclusion as a sure foundation. Taking Aristotle's lead, Albert the Great, Aquinas, and others in fact, Weisheipl argues, were quite well aware of 38~ BOOK REVIEWS the more mathematically grounded method in studying nature. The work they did especially in astronomy, optics, and harmonics, W eisheipl points out, clearly reveals their belief in the heuristic power of mathematics. He readily admits that the earlier attempts to ' save the appearances ' with relatively primitive mathematical tools pale in comparison with the modern achievement, but he thinks the fundamental instinct so remarkably exploited by later scientists is already evident in earlier times. At the core of Weisheipl's exposition of Aristotelian/medieval science is the basic concept of nature, and the frequent failure of scholars to understand this concept conectly is, in his view, the major underlying reason for so much confusion. " For Aristotle..., v. (shrink)

Someone is “verballed” in the Anglo-Australian idiom if they have attributed to them statements they did not actually make and indeed have explicitly denied. We will examine the evidence that Kuhn and Feyerabend were verballed in this sense by their critics and that the role of the idea of incommensurability in their argumentation has been systematically misunderstood and -represented. In particular, we will see that neither Kuhn nor Feyerabend, despite what their critics often say about them, held that incommensurability (...) of theories implies the rational incomparability of theories. This is especially clear in the case of Feyerabend, whose argument is NOT that theories in a scientific tradition are on occasion incommensurable, but, rather, that, when the relations of theories in a tradition are represented in a particular way, they may on occasion be incommensurable according to that representation and hence incomparable if that representation is taken as providing the mechanisms of comparison. And the point of this claim is not to establish something about science, but, rather, to establish something about the representations of science which yield this result (i.e. that two theories might be incommensurable). Feyerabend in other words invokes incommensurability (according to the standards of a particular representation) as a reductio of that mode of representation. And this argument in fact depends precisely on the comparability of theories which are, according to the representation, incommensurable. Feyerabend’s argument is about the ways in which we should understand progress in science and he is concerned, in particular, to establish that a historically informed approach is superior to an approach which, if applicable, is applicable only to what he calls “abstract traditions”. Kuhn’s work, especially in the Postscript—1969, provides complementary materials, especially in relation to a collectivised and non-“algorithmic” account of theory choice across formally incommensurable paradigms. (shrink)

Excerpt: In 1995, the Leo Apostel Centre in Brussels, Belgium, organised an international conference called ``Einstein meets Magritte''. Nobel prize winner Ilya Prigogine held the opening lecture at the conference, and Heinz von Foerster's lecture was scheduled last... Heinz von Foerster was enchanted by the conference theme and -- in the spirit of surrealist Belgian painter René Magritte -- had chosen an appropriate title for his talk: ``Ceci n'est pas Albert Einstein''. ... [H]e was delighted to grant the organisers (...) the following interview, in which he tells us about an even longer journey -- that of his remarkable life and scientific career. (shrink)

Among the many names violently consigned to oblivion, one cannot omit mentioning the name of Gustav Gustavovich Shpet, a scholar who made a substantial contribution to our country's philosophy, psychology, aesthetics, and linguistics. His rehabilitation in 1956 was not enough to restore his memory in public consciousness, paralyzed by the inertia and fears of the Stalinist years, and the freeze that began soon after, of the sprouts that had just been summoned to life, had its impact in an abrogation of (...) agreements, cessation of publications, and in a number of cases removal of references to the philosopher. And the further thirty years of oblivion that followed were one more period of unjust punishment and a new ordeal in the terrible fate of the scholar and his ideas. His writings, which should have been a new word in science, should have given direction to further investigations, became effectively inaccessible to subsequent generations. References to Shpet in the works of Viach. Vs. Ivanov, Iu. M. Lotman, D. S. Likhachev, A. P. Chudakov, and others, and the article in Philosophical Encyclopedia [Filosofskaia entsiklopediia] written by V. S. Asmus aroused interest in Shpet's writings in Hungary and Germany. In the summer of 1986, an international conference on Shpet was held in Bochum, and his books are being translated. Unfortunately, in his own country the level of research on the philosopher's writings and thoughts is still almost at point zero, but we may hope that interest in Shpet's ideas will grow considerably in connection with the publication of the series From the History of Russian Philosophical Thought [Iz istorii otechestvennoi filosofskoi mysli] and a number of other publications. (shrink)

English summary: This book, the fourth volume of the Raison scolastique, attempts to historicize the concept of moral judgement. Thirteenth century medieval and Scholastic thought, in search of a specific set of ethics, attempted to distance themselves from previously held taboos. They therefore moved towards a defined set of standards that revolved around the moral and legal notion of responsibility, which remains to the present day. French description: Ce livre, qui constitue le tome IV de la Raison scolastique, tente (...) d'historiciser la notion de jugement moral. La pensee medievale et scolastique du XIIIe siecle, en quete d'une ethique specifique et immanente, s'est emancipee de lourds tabous et a travaille a la delegation affectee a l'homme pour la production de normes morales. Ainsi, elle a pu associer au reve d'une symphonie des actes, autour de Thomas d'Aquin, les chants de l'individu (Chiaro de Florence, Olivi, Astesano ou Ockham). L'ethique de cette periode tourne autour de la notion juridicomorale de responsabilite, qui demeure jusqu'a nos jours, et sans vraie resolution, une ligne de faite de la vie ethique. Si le mot n'a pas ete cree au Moyen Age, la notion, sous le nom d'imputation et d'imputabilite, fut tres fermement discutee. La situation de discussion restait ouverte, tant que cette notion n'etait pas inscrite dans des codes. C'est une orchestration coherente de l'ethique qui a subi le silence du formalisme scotiste, malgre un ulterieur intermede jesuite. Cette situation suscite des echos dans le monde contemporain occidental ou le long cycle des jugements formels, conduisant a l'imperatif categorique (le Sollen) de Kant, fut suivi d'une reaction intense: l'ethique avait a juger singulierement les actes humains. A ce mouvement, il faut associer la periode 1860-1960 (Renouvier, Nietzsche, Freud, Arendt), a laquelle succede un nouveau formalisme. Certes, le droit est revenu absorber la morale, notamment avec une nouvelle pregnance de la responsabilite, qui reduit les conduites humaines au risque de faute. Mais l'histoire montre que d'autres retours sont possibles. (shrink)

Le Yaoundé PhD Seminar-Theories of Justice est un séminaire international et pluridisciplinaire qui se tient depuis 2012 à Yaoundé. Il réunit des professeurs et des doctorants africains et non africains ainsi que des professionnels et des représentants de la société civile autour de questions de justice sociale et de politique publique. À l'initiative de doctorants africains et non africains, il a été mis en place conjointement par la Chaire Hoover de l'Université catholique de Louvain et par le Centre d’études et (...) de recherches sur la justice sociale et politique de l’Université catholique d’Afrique centrale dans le but de bâtir une véritable solidarité entre le Nord et le Sud dans le domaine de la formation académique et de la recherche. The Yaoundé PhD Seminar-Theories of Justice is an international and multidisciplinary seminar which is held since 2012 in Yaoundé. It brings together teachers and African and non-African doctoral students as well as professionals and representatives of civil society around issues of social justice and public policy. At the initiative of African and non-African students, it has been implemented jointly by the Hoover Chair of the Catholic University of Louvain and the Centre of studies and research on social justice and political of the Catholic University of Central Africa in order to build a genuine solidarity between the North and the South in the field of academic training and research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:342 BOOK REVIEWS (5) What follows for the " critical " and " systematic " dimensions of theology, if, accepting Balthasar's centering of thought in (the paradoxes of) love and beauty, one sees mystery, metaphor, concrete imagery, and indeed "myth" as essential and not "accidental" to all theological meaning? In opening up these questions, O'Hanlon's important book identifies the areas where dialogue with Balthasar's work might best begin, even (...) as it makes its own constructive contribution to theology. John Paul II Institute Washington, D.C. DAVID L. SCHINDLER Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. By JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992. Pp. xii + 212. $25.00 (paper). James Keenan says that he began his work on this book " believing the simple presupposition that goodness describes persons and rightness describes actions" (p. ix). The main focus of the study is the question of whether and to what extent this distinction can be found in the work of Aquinas. The author holds that the understanding of the relation of reason and will in the early work of Aquinas precludes the distinction of goodness and rightness held by the author and other contemporary moralists. Keenan claims, however, to find in the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae a significant shift in Aquinas's notion of the will and its relation to reason, a shift toward an " autonomous will." Keenan states in the Introduction: "The will's autonomy is a necessary condition for understanding moral goodness "; indeed he proceeds to note that " without it there can be no distinction " between goodness and rightness (pp. ix-x). Before commenting on Keenan's work I will first briefly summarize the basic points of the book. The book is divided into four parts. In the first part we see the distinction between goodness and rightness. Keenan explains the distinction: Goodness and badness describe whether or not we strive to the extent we are able to attain rightness in our lives and actions. Rightness and wrongness describe whether or not we attain the end that reason dictates is proper and necessary for our lives and actions (p. ix). Keenan finds the foundation for this distinction in the reasoning of G. E. Moore. A person's actions can he judged right or wrong independently of a consideration of the person's motives. For instance, a BOOK REVIEWS 343 right action might be performed by a good person or by a bad person, the goodness or badness being determined by the motive. There are, then, two distinct moral descriptions; one, goodness or badness, pertains to persons and the other, rightness and wrongness, pertains to actions. Keenan joins several contemporary moral theologians in claiming something which Moore did not, namely, that " a person who performs a wrong action can be called good for performing the action" (p. 6). This assertion is based upon an understanding of goodness as determined " antecedent to action " (p. 15), and likewise as " antecedent to and distinct from rightness" (p. 7). Moral goodness is determined by the motivation, and motivation alone, of the person acting (p. 14). For example, does the person act out of love for God and neighbor, or rather out of a desire for self-aggrandizement? Jn question here is what Keenan calls the " fundamental, formal self-movement of the agent" (p. 14). Rightness on the other hand is a moral description determined by the measure of reason. It describes actions, and can also describe the agent, in terms of right order in relation to the end of human life. In Part II (the second and third chapters) Keenan turns to the supposed shift in the thought of Aquinas regarding reason and will. Keenan finds the early position of Aquinas incompatible with the distinction of goodness and rightness, but the later position compatible with the distinction. Keenan also presents Aquinas's distinction between specification and exercise in the act of the will as crucial to the distinction between goodness and rightness. I will return to this point shortly. Part III (the fourth and fifth chapters) considers Aquinas's treatises on the human act and moral virtue found in Summa Theologiae I-II. Keenan holds that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Beyond the Ethics of Wealth and a World of Economic InequalityMark D. WoodAnalyzing the ethics of wealth and the relationship between the dominant ethics of wealth and economic inequality is vital to creating a humane mode of global life. We are living during a period in which the unequal concentration of wealth—which is to say, the unequal concentration of the resources that make human existence, development, and fulfillment possible—has (...) never been greater.1 The World Bank reports that almost “1.3 billion people remain below the extreme poverty line with an income of US $1.25 or less a day. Close to 2.5 billion—more than one-third of the world’s population—live on less than US $2 a day, another common measurement of deep deprivation,”2 and a staggering 80 percent of the world’s population struggles to survive on less than US $10 dollars a day.3 Credit Suisse’s 2012 Global Wealth Report indicates “the bottom half of the global population [or more than 3.5 billion persons] possess barely 1 percent of total wealth... In sharp contrast, the richest 10 percent own 86 percent of the world’s wealth, with the top 1 percent alone accounting for 46 percent of global assets.”4 Given the history of international colonial and neocolonial relations, it comes as no surprise that wealth is highly concentrated in Western Europe and North America, while the overwhelming majority of individuals living in poverty are concentrated in Africa, India, Asia, and Central and South America.5The wealth gap between the top 10 percent and the bottom 90 percent is, however, also reaching record levels in developed nations. While in 2012, the United States had the seventh highest average wealth holdings per adult in the world, “among nations with at least a quarter-million adults, only Russia, Ukraine, and Lebanon are more unequal” than the United States.6 A Reuters investigative report published in 2012 reveals that “inequality has risen not just in plutocratic hubs such as Wall Street and Silicon Valley, but also in virtually every corner of the world’s richest nation: Inequality has increased in 49 of 50 states since 1989,” with Mississippi being the only exception, even as it still “ranks worst in the nation on both counts.”7 In 2010, “the top 1 percent of households (the upper class) owned 35.4 percent of all privately held wealth, and the next 19 percent (the managerial, professional, and small business stratum) had 53.5 percent, which means that just 20 percent of the people owned a remarkable 89 percent, leaving only 11 percent of the wealth for the bottom 80 percent [End Page 125] (wage and salary workers).”8 In The Price of Inequality (2012), Nobel Prize–winning economist Joseph E. Stiglitz indicates that the “six heirs to the Walmart empire command wealth of $69.7 billion dollars, which is equivalent to the entire wealth of the bottom 30 percent of U.S. society.”9 In short, six individuals possess more wealth than do ninety-six million individuals—though this figure is misleading inasmuch as most of the ninety-six million own almost nothing but mounting debt. Most significantly, the top 10 percent own between 81 percent and 94 percent of all stocks, bonds, trust funds, and business equity, and almost 80 percent of non-home real estate.10 G. William Domhoff makes the vital point that inasmuch as “financial wealth is what counts as far as the control of income-producing assets,” that is, control of the means of producing wealth, “we can say that just 10 percent of the people own the United States of America.”11 Meanwhile, according to the latest census, fifty million Americans qualify as poor and another 100 million qualify as low income.12The concentration of the lion’s share of wealth in the hands of a tiny fraction of humanity is devastating for the majority of people living on the planet and ultimately for everyone. On the ground, capitalism’s champagne glass–shaped distribution of wealth means that hundreds of millions of persons have barely enough of the basics necessary to exist. Between 24,000... (shrink)

By way of preface it should be noted that Jordan was mainly concerned with formulating a metaphysics of value and a philosophy of art. And although this formulation can serve as a foundation for specific art criticism, Jordan was not attempting such criticism, and should not be held responsible for not doing what was extraneous to his purpose. It is helpful to remember also that Jordan's polemics are directed against a philosophy of subjectivism in the theory of art criticism (...) and art creation; i.e., he denies that the private consciousness is the sole standard of the nature and value of a work of art, and he denies that the artist creates by merely revealing the state of his own internal feelings and emotions. (shrink)

The first two sections of this paper are devoted respectively to the criticisms of my views raised by Stephen Engstrom and Andrews Reath at a symposium on Kant's Theory of Freedom held in Washington D.C. on 28 December 1992 under the auspices of the North American Kant Society. The third section contains my response to the remarks of Marcia Baron at a second symposium in Chicago on 24 April 1993 at the APA Western Division meetings. The fourth section deals (...) with some general criticisms of my treatment of Kant's theory of freedom and its connection with transcendental idealism that have been raised by Karl Ameriks, who was also a participant in the second symposium, in an earlier piece published in Inquiry and by Paul Guyer in a review. The paper as a whole is thus an attempt to reformulate and clarify some of the central claims of my book in light of the initial critical reaction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Hobbism and His Anti-Hobbism Daniel E. Flage Thomas Hobbes posed a crise morale to which British philosophers attempted to reply for over a century.1 Hobbes maintained that the terms 'good' and 'evil' have no import beyond individual self-interest and the fulfilment or failure to fulfil one's desires.2 While alluding to lawsofnature knownbyreason,3whetherone deems suchlaws dictates ofprudence4 or laws of some moral import,5 Hobbes held: (1) that the (...) notion ofjustice arises only after the institution of a commonwealth, and (2) that the dictates of justice are merely the dictates of the sovereign.6 Hence, justice is strictly a matter ofconvention. In this paper I argue that the Hume ofthe Treatise was a mitigated Hobbist.7 Like Hobbes, Hume held that the notions of justice and obligation reston a setofconventional social rules. Hume distinguished himselffrom Hobbes primarily with respecttoquestions ofmoral value, and though he provided an account of moral obligation, this was secondary to his considerations of moral value. To establish this, I briefly examine the 'is'-'ought' paragraph before turning to Hume's discussions of obligation and value. 1. 'Is' and Ought' To understand the 'is'-'ought' paragraph, one must consider it in the context of Treatise 3.1.1. There Hume examines the source of one's knowledge ofmoral value, namely, "Whether 'tis by means ofour ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?"s Hume's discussion, however, moves rather freely between considerations ofmoral value ('good' and 'evil', 'virtue' and Vice') and considerations of moral obligation Cright' and'wrong"). Evenin the 'is'-'ought'paragraph, a paragraph that seems to be concerned with purported relations between questions offact and questions ofmoral obligation, Hume explicitly alludes to value claims at the end of the paragraph (T 470). Since a moral philosopher might make any one of three claims regarding the relations between value and obligation, namely, (a) value claims are primary and obligation claims are dependent on them;9 (b) obligation claims are primary and value claims are dependent upon them;10 or (c) there are independent grounds for claims of value and obligation, I argue that Hume was attempting to dispel position (b). If this is correct, then Hume's Volume XVIII Number 2 369 DANIEL E. FLAGE arguments both pave the way for a conventionalist theory ofobligation and undercut Hobbes's rationalistic account ofnatural law.11 Hume's discussion in Treatise 1.1.1 is a critique of moral rationalism. It consists of two types of arguments. First, there is an argument from motivation that since moral qualities influence the passions, but whatis known by reason does notinfluence the passions, moral qualities are not known by reason (T 458-63). Second, there is a series of arguments to show that moral qualities cannot be known by reason. In examining some ofthe latter discussions, we shall see how in rejecting a rationalistic ground for moral obligation, Hume also undercuts any rationalistic ground for claims ofmoral value.12 Remember, Hume's question was "Whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?" (T 456). The rationalists answered this question in terms ofideas, claiming, that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; thattheimmutable measures ofrightand wrongimpose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion, that moraUty, like truth, is discern'd merely by ideas, and by their juxta-position and comparison. (T 456-57) In this, his initial account ofthe rationalists' position, Hume seems to focus on moral obligation, rather than moral value: the alleged eternal fitnesses seem to be moral rules such as, "All cases ofwilful murder are wrong," rather than rules such as, "All cases of wilful murder are vicious (evil)." If it were possible to establish that a rule of moral obUgation is true, a moralist might accept an additional putatively self-evident bridge-principle that, "Any action that is right (wrong) is virtuous (vicious)," and thereby deduce a claim of moral value... (shrink)

The word “objective” is of course the trouble–maker here, Miss Smith assumes that if an aesthetic statement is held to be objective then it is the physical existence of the work of art that constitutes the objectivity: i.e. if a work of art is exteroceptively perceivable, then an aesthetic statement involving it is objective. Some writers, however have held that in genuine works of art there is manifested an ultimate spiritual Reality which we apprehend when we appreciate such (...) works. On this theory, an aesthetic statement has an objective reference if the subject of it succeeds in expressing or communicating such a supersensible Reality: if it fails to do so, then the statement is subjective, i.e. it can be analysed completely into a statement about our feelings or emotions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:66 IN DEFENCE OF KEMP SMITH D. C. Stove argues against Kemp Smith's contention that Hume's philosophy "was intended not to subvert but to endorse our natural beliefs" in general, and our belief in the Causal Principle in particular. His arguments are insufficient. Kemp Smith does not need to deny that the falsity of the Causal Principle is believed by Hume to be possible in the strongest of Stove's (...) three suggested 2 senses: it is not merely self-consistent, but the Principle is unverifiable and unconfirmable in the sense that no empirical proposition is relevant to its truth. However, to say flatly that its falsity is possible is to say that it is not impossible in any way at all; and that is what is at stake both in Hume's letter to Stewart and in the use Kemp Smith makes of it. If Hume had written a letter to Stewart or to any scientific enquirer urging him to desist from his labours on the ground that "something may begin to exist, or start into being without a cause," he would have been a fool, and in representing Hume's position in this way Stewart is in fact calling Hume a fool. It is not surprising that Hume is indignant. The problem is whether, and how, one can hold both that the Causal Principle is undeniably true and that it can be supported neither by deductive nor by inductive argument, and whether Hume on the most reasonable interpretation of his published works held both these views. Clues to the answer lie in the in tradition of sceptical philosophy, and in the difference between a cause and a reason. Hume's philosophy is indeed, as he says, 'very sceptical'. But scepticism is a kind of philosophy with a long history, from Sextus Empiricus to Bayle, and it is reasonable to suppose that Hume was aligning himself with this position, especially since so much of the argument in 67 the Treatise is derived from Bayle. But sceptics do not behave otherwise than ordinary men. Scepticism is not directed against everyday beliefs but again.st arguments: this is a point on which Sextus insists." It would not be the part of a sceptic to doubt that every event has a cause, but to refute all arguments purporting to show that such is the case. To assert "that any thing might arise without a Cause" would not be scepticism, but an inverse dogmatism: to infer from a philosophical argument a belief about the real world that is at variance with everyday belief. The crucial step in Stove's argument occurs in his gloss of Hume's claim that he had maintained "that our Certainty of the Falsehood of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source" phrase "sic., experience, of course". This could be misleading. It could mean that Hume here claims that experience gives us reason to believe that the Causal Principle is true; and this Hume has denied, as Stove urges ad loc. But nothing in what Hume says in his letter requires us to interpret him thus. And his sceptical principles tell against it: an argument from experience, whether inductive or by analogy or whatever, is still an argument and thus liable to sceptical attack. What Hume could mean, and what Kemp Smith took him to mean, is that our experience causes us to regard the principle as necessary: experience is not a premise in any sort of argument at all, but a causal explanation for a universal propensity to believe in the Causal Principle. It is true that Hume's citation as analogues of such empirical affirmations as "That Caesar existed" is misleading. But it is not in fact the case that Hume represents these as in any way 'parallel' with the Causal Principle: he says only that, like it, They are believed without recourse to Reason and Intuition. In 68 point of fact, Stove is going a bit far when he says that this is (like "There is such an Island as Sicily") an observation-statement; but that point is hardly relevant here. It is worth noting that in the offending passage... (shrink)

Modern empirical macroeconomic models, known as structural autoregressions (SVARs) are dynamic models that typically claim to represent a causal order among contemporaneously valued variables and to merely represent non-structural (reduced-form) co-occurence between lagged variables and contemporaneous variables. The strategy is held to meet the minimal requirements for identifying the residual errors in particular equations in the model with independent, though otherwise not directly observable, exogenous causes (“shocks”) that ultimately account for change in the model. In nonstationary models, such shocks (...) accumulate so that variables have discernible trends. Econometricians have conceived of variables that trend in sympathy with each other (so-called “cointegrated variables”) as sharing one or more of these unobserved trends as a common cause. It is possible for estimates of the values of both the otherwise unobservable individual shocks and the otherwise unobservable common trends to be backed-out of cointegrated systems of equations. The issue addressed in this paper is whether and in what circumstances these values can be regarded as observations of real entities rather than merely artifacts of the representation of variables in the model. The issue is related, on the one hand, to practical methodological problems in the use of SVARs for policy analysis—e.g., does it make sense to estimate of shocks or trends in one model and then use them as measures of variables in a conceptually distinct model? The issue is also related to debates in the philosophical analysis of causation—particularly, whether we are entitled, as assumed by the developers of Bayes-net approaches, to rely on the causal Markov condition (a generalization of Reichenbach’s common-cause condition) or whether cointegration generates a practical example of Nancy Cartwright’s “byproducts” objection to the causal Markov condition. (shrink)

The majority of papers in this special issue were presented at a conference, ‘The Advancement of Science and the Dilemma of Dual Use: Why We Can’t Afford to Fail’ held on 9–10 November 2007. The conference chairman was Andrzej Górski and its patrons were UNESCO and the President of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Three additional papers on the subject of Dual Use have been included in this issue; the authors are T. A. Cavanaugh , J. Forge and D. (...) Koepsall. (shrink)

The dissertation is a detailed philosophical interpretation of the entire text of Plato's Sophist. In addition to extended analysis of the argument and discussion of many current interpretations, special attention is given to the following themes as they occur in other Platonic dialogues as well as the Sophist: ; Plato's theory of Knowledge: What is it that can be known? And how does one get to know it? Do the Sophist and other late dialogues show a change in Plato's views, (...) or an elaboration of views he held when he wrote such works as the Phaedo and the Republic? ;: these fall into three types: those with propositional structures, those which are structured like descriptions, i.e. denoting complexes, and definitions, which are denoting complexes of a special sort. Each of these types is discussed, and the role of definitions in Plato's theory of knowledge is explained. ; Judgments: what is a judgment, or opinion? How does a judgment come to be made? Plato distinguished questions about the internal structure of judgments or opinions from questions about what is involved in a person's coming to judge, or believe, or opine something. Both sorts of questions are discussed in the dissertation. ; Truth and falsity: two notions of truth, together with corresponding notions of falsity, are distinguished. One is a notion of truth as predicated of propositionally structured simpliciter. This is the notion which plays a dominate role in the Sophist. The other notion, which rears its head in the Cratylus and a short section of the Phaedrus, if a notion of true of as predicted of names and and what they are said of. Both notions, and other notions of truth held by Plato's philosophical opponents, are explained and discussed. ; Negation: What is the problem about being and not being^which arises in the Sophist? How is it related to the problem raised^as to how false judgments and are possible? Plato believed^that Parmenides made a mistaken assumption about negation, and^that that assumption could be used by sophists such as Protagoras^and Gorgias to undermine the thesis that mistaken judgments and^false occur. The central pages of the Sophist are devoted to^uncovering Parmenides' error, and to offering a replacement for the^assumption which Plato rejects. Plato then shows how the replacement he suggests can beused in an analysis of true and false and judgments. ;Numerous other themes arise in the course of the analysis of the argument--Plato's notions of time and change, of images, of explanation, etc. These, too, are discussed. There are twenty one appendices containing discussions of points of translation, alternative interpretations of key passages, formal proofs not appropriate for inclusion in the main body of the text and too extended for footnotes, and remarks on various passages occurring in other Platonic dialogues helpful in glossing the Sophist. (shrink)

To show the implicit philosophy in the thought of a person who does not think of himself as a philosopher and who does not write systematically, is not an easy task. Nevertheless, Professor Richards of the University of Stirling has done an admirable work in organizing the scattered observations of Gandhi under nine major heads and in showing their interrelation. In this way the book is more comprehensive though not more sympathetic than D. M. Datta’s earlier work of the same (...) title. Richards maintains that Gandhi’s ideas “spring from firmly-held metaphysical beliefs” and discerningly traces their relation to Hindu thought and other factors. (shrink)